SALAMANCA, 22 July 1812  The year of 1812 had begun in a blaze of glory for Wellington's army and Hill's attack on the forts at Almaraz set the seal on a remarkably successful five-month period. The triumphant roll was not finished yet though, for in July Wellington achieved one of his and the British Army's greatest victories. The spectacular gains achieved by Wellington during the first half of the year became all the more significant when news began to filter through to him of the steady withdrawal from Spain of a large number of French troops, including the Imperial Guard, who were destined to take part in the fateful invasion of Russia that year. From now on, the already hard-pressed and harassed French armies would fight with an increased disadvantage, one which the Spanish guerrillas in particular were quick to seize upon. The French armies in Spain were placed under the command of Napoleon's brother, Joseph, and it was Marmont's Army of Portugal, some 52,000-strong, that posed the more immediate problem for Wellington, whose own troops numbered just over 60,000. During the first days of June Wellington began to concentrate his army for a thrust into central Spain against Marmont, a move that would threaten the main French communications and a move that would almost certainly bring French reinforcements rushing to Marmont's assistance. Wellington hoped to prevent this latter eventuality by planning a series of concerted moves and concentrations elsewhere in Spain to keep the French forces occupied. Having satisfied himself that all these arrangements had been made Wellington, on June 13th, began his advance from Ciudad Rodrigo with 48,000 men and 54 guns. Four days later the Allied army entered Salamanca unopposed although Marmont had left garrisons in three small forts in the western suburbs of the town. These were besieged and fell on June 27th. For the next three weeks the two armies were in close proximity to each other and on July 18th marched parallel with each other on opposite sides of the Guarena river, the bands of the two armies playing as they marched. This close marching continued for the next two days and by the night of the 21st both armies had crossed the river Tormes and camped within a few hundred yards of each other. That night Mother Nature provided her own spectacular backdrop to the campaigning when a violent storm broke overhead and when the moon disappeared behind the inky black clouds it was left to the silver streaks of lightning to illuminate the surrounding countryside. Several troopers of the 5th Dragoon Guards were killed by lightning while dozens of horses bolted, charging over their riders as they lay on the ground. The confusion was added to by a torrential downpour from which there was little shelter. These types of weather conditions were to be repeated at Sorauren and, more famously, at Waterloo, by which time Wellington's men had come to look upon such storms before battle as an omen of victory. On the morning of July 22nd both armies resumed their march south, still parallel with each other, the rays of the sun warming the troops on both sides after their soaking the night before. The two armies marched across flat, rolling countryside with no remarkable features other than two very distinctive-shaped hills, the first, a rounded ridge to the north-east of the village of Los Arapiles called the Lesser Arapil, and the second, called the Greater Arapil, a box-shaped hill some 100 feet high about half a mile to the south of the Lesser Arapil. These two hills lay in the middle of an undulating plain, about nine miles long, stretching from the small village of Calvarasa de Arriba in the east, to Miranda de Azan in the west. The village of Los Arapiles lay just to the left of centre of the plain. Marmont's intention was to severe the road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo, along which Wellington had begun to send his baggage and supplies. To accomplish this Marmont needed to outstrip his opponents and turn west across the head of the leading British columns. At around 8 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd Marmont's troops became involved in a race with a Portuguese brigade to occupy the Greater Arapil. Some brief but heavy fighting occurred here but the Portuguese were driven back and Marmont was left in possession of the Greater Arapil while Wellington occupied the Lesser Arapil. There was little fighting throughout the rest of the morning as both armies continued their march south-west. Marmont, meanwhile, watched from his lofty position on the Greater Arapil and spotted a cloud of dust rising from behind the Lesser Arapil in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo which seemed to confirm his belief that Wellington was retreating. The column was, in fact, Pakenham's 3rd Division which Wellington had brought forward to Aldea Tejada either to protect his right flank or to act as an independent force. The French columns were moving faster than Wellington's own men who had halted around the village of Los Arapiles and by early afternoon the divisions of Thomieres, Maucune and Clausel were well on their way heading west to the Rodrigo road and were strung out in a long line some four miles long. It soon became apparent that the leading French division, that of Thomieres', was outstripping Maucune's division which was following behind, and a considerable gap opened up between them, something that did not go unnoticed by Wellington who was having lunch in the village of Los Arapiles. Wellington peered through his telescope and could hardly believe what he was seeing. Sending his lunch flying through the air, he exclaimed, "By God! That will do!" and galloped off to Aldea Tejada to order Pakenham to attack immediately. It was about 3.30pm and the long, dusty columns of French troops were hurrying across the Ciudad Rodrigo road to cut off Wellington's escape route. Thomieres himself must have felt fairly safe and secure, and he was certainly unaware of the storm that was about to break around him. That storm arrived in the shape of Pakenham's 3rd Division which suddenly appeared on Thomieres' right flank supported by 1,100 cavalry who scattered the leading French companies like sheep. The shock of seeing Pakenham's battalions just a few hundred yards away must have been immense. One moment the French were grasping the initiative, the next they had it wrenched violently from them by nearly 6,000 British and Portuguese infantry who smashed into them, unleashing volley after volley into their packed and panicking ranks. Thomieres' leading column was ripped apart by the ferocity of the attack which saw hundreds killed and wounded in minutes. Thomieres himself was killed and the casualty figures for the two leading battalions are comparable with those sustained by Colborne's brigade at Albuera the previous year; the leading regiment lost 1,031 of its 1,449 men, while the second regiment lost 868 out of 1,123 men. With Thomieres gone and the leading regiments destroyed the rest of Thomieres' division disintegrated and fled in panic to the south-east. Leith's 5th Division, supported by Bradford's Portuguese, had been launched into the attack about forty minutes after Pakenham. Advancing directly south from Los Arapiles the 8,500 Allied troops struck at Maucune's division which had been following Thomieres at a distance. The French, numbering about 5,000 men, were outnumbered but expected help shortly from Brennier's division which was hurrying to its support. Maucune had seen the damage that the Allied cavalry had done to Thomieres' division and accordingly formed his nine battalions into squares. Unfortunately, on this occasion it was the wrong formation and when Greville's and Pringle's brigades came up, after having advanced through a heavy French artillery barrage, they simply levelled their muskets and unloaded them into the dense French ranks, sweeping away the French squares with three devastating volleys. The French troops who survived this onslaught broke and fled in the same direction as the survivors of Thomieres' division. It was now, more than ever, that they needed to be in square formation for as they looked back they saw, to their horror, Le Marchant's brigade of heavy dragoons thundering after them, their long, heavy sabres glinting in the bright sunlight. The fugitives tried to defend themselves as best they could but they were easy meat for the dragoons who swept over them with ease, chopping and hacking all around them. Five French battalions were left totally destroyed in the wake of Le Marchant's men who now saw before them, running to aid Maucune's men, the 4,300 men of Brennier's division. Brennier's men were exhausted by their hurried, mile-long dash to aid Maucune and even though they had time to form square they were not steady enough to resist the power of the dragoons. A ragged volley brought a few horses and riders crashing to the ground, horses which smashed into the squares causing great confusion and panic. Other dragoons came charging in and in a few minutes Brennier's division, too, was streaming away towards the woods to the south-east. Le Marchant's dragoons soon became drunk on success and got completely out of control. Even Le Marchant could not hold them in check. The French ran around like frightened sheep as the dragoons flayed in every direction. Unlike other cavalry `misadventures' during the Peninsular War there was no effective enemy cavalry force to take advantage of the disorder and Le Marchant's men went about their business unopposed. Le Marchant himself did manage to keep one squadron in check, however, which engaged some French infantry close to the woods to the south-east of the battlefield. Here, tragically, Le Marchant met his death when he was hit by a single musket ball that broke his spine. It was a bitter blow to Wellington who had seen one of the few capable cavalry commanders taken from him. He died knowing his men had done their job and when they returned, breathless and excited to their own lines they could look back over a trail of devastation which had contributed to the destruction of no less than three whole French divisions. And It had taken just forty minutes. Further to the east of Los Arapiles Wellington's men were not so successful for when Cole's 4th Division advanced to the east of the Greater Arapil it was flung back in bloody disorder by two fresh French divisions, but not before having engaged a numerically superior enemy in a furious fire-fight. On the Greater Arapil itself Pack's Portuguese brigade met with a similar fate. These French success combined to provide Clausel - now in command following serious wounds to first Marmont and then Bonnet, who was killed - with the prospect of being able to stem the tide of the battle and possibly even retrieve the situation for the French. His counter-attack was intelligently planned and executed with flawless precision by 12,000 men of the French 2nd and 8th Divisions who strode doggedly across the plain between the two Arapiles while Sarrut's division held Pakenham's victorious 3rd Division in check on their left flank. The bold French manoeuvre was strangled at birth however for Wellington had anticipated the move with almost clairvoyant-like accuracy. He had deployed the two British brigades of Clinton's 6th Division in the by now standard two-deep line, with Rezende's Portuguese in line behind them. On Clinton's right were Spry's Portuguese while Anson's brigade, from Cole's 4th Division, was brought up alongside on Clinton's left. Clausel's men advanced under heavy fire from the Allied artillery on and behind the Lesser Arapil which mowed down whole files of men. When their columns had got halfway across the plain between the two hills they came face to face with Clinton's lines which opened up a rolling volley that engulfed the heads of the columns, sending them staggering backwards. For a few brief minutes the French returned the fire but their formation was against them. Although numerically superior to Clinton's men their columns could not match the firepower of the British lines and they were driven back in disorder. All but three Marmont's eight infantry divisions had been swept away and Wellington's men pressed forward on all sides to complete their victory. The sun had begun to set when Wellington ordered Clinton forward in pursuit of the fleeing French fugitives but when they had passed the Greater Arapil Clinton's men came up against Ferrey's division, some 5,500 men who had yet to see any serious action during the day. Ferrey formed his seven battalions into a three-deep line and, for a change, it was the turn of the red-jacketed British to experience the firepower of such a formation. The French checked the British advance and even forced them back. In fact, Ferrey was only forced to retreat when threatened on his flank. Unfortunately, Ferrey was not amongst those who fled the battlefield as he was cut in two by a round shot from an Allied gun. The battle was as good as over and thousands of defeated French troops streamed away to the woods to the south-east and to the bridge at Alba de Tormes. After several days of hard marching and due to the rigours of the battle itself Wellington's men were too exhausted to affect a serious pursuit. However, since the bridge over the Tormes at Alba de Tormes was held by Spanish troops under Carlos de Espana Wellington was quietly confident of being able to capture the whole. Unfortunately, de Espana had withdrawn his troops, much to the annoyance of an exasperated Wellington, and the French were able to make good their escape although hundreds of isolated and scattered fugitives were taken by Allied cavalry during the next few days. The victory at Salamanca had cost Wellington 5,214 casualties of which 3,176 were British. The exact French casualty figure is hard to determine although it is fairly certain to have been around 14,000. Twenty guns were also taken. The battle of Salamanca nailed the belief that Wellington was just an over-cautious and defensive-minded commander and when news of the victory spread throughout Europe his reputation as one of the great commanders was assured. On August 12th Wellington's army entered Madrid amidst much rejoicing by the people who could experience the feeling of freedom from French occupation for the first time since December 1808. The following month Wellington headed north-east to lay siege to Burgos but here the magic was to desert him during an operation which he himself was to call the worst scrape he was ever in. We'd like to thank Ian Fletcher, renowned military author on the Peninsula and Waterloo, for his contribution to our website.